

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF GAS RESOURCES | INQUIRY

Australian Energy Producers | 13 April 2026

As the peak representative body for oil and gas explorers and producers, who are large taxpayers and essential to Australia's economy, Australian Energy Producers welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this Inquiry.

The Australian oil and gas industry paid a record \$21.9 billion in taxes and royalties in 2024-25.¹ The industry remains the second-highest contributor to Commonwealth income taxes in Australia, accounting for 1 in every 10 company tax dollars paid.² The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has confirmed that some oil and gas companies are among the largest taxpayers in Australia.³ Treasury forecasts that the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) alone will raise \$5.4 billion in receipts over the next four years.⁴

Company tax and PRRT already ensure that Commonwealth revenues increase when company profits increase. Australia's oil and gas tax regime equates to an effective tax rate between 54% and 58%, across company tax, PRRT, state royalties and a range of other government taxes, levies and fees (see appendix). Independent analysis by Westpac projects that higher-than-assumed prices for coal and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports will deliver approximately \$20 billion in additional revenue to the Australian Government over the 5 years to 2029-30.⁵

Australia's tax regime for oil and gas is very different to that of Norway and Qatar. Norway and Qatar share risk and reward through state investment and supportive tax arrangements, which lower upfront costs and provide fiscal stability. Since 2008, the PRRT has been extensively reviewed by government and parliament 6 times, and substantively amended 5 times – including in 2024 to legislate a deductions cap and a narrower interpretation of deductible exploration expenditure. The PRRT is also regularly examined in Budget estimates.

An export windfall levy could render LNG projects uneconomic and put up to 19,000 PJ of gas production and approximately A\$70.4 billion of government revenue at risk. Analysis by Wood Mackenzie finds that imposing a 25% export levy on LNG exports could increase the effective tax rate of a project to as high as 83%, and reduce the value generated by oil and gas projects by as much as 94%. Such a tax would also adversely affect the availability of domestic gas supplies, reduce the longevity and valuations of Australia's existing LNG facilities, and raise sovereign risk concerns for our LNG trading and investment partners. The United Kingdom's Energy Profits Levy has led to significant decreases in investment and put billions of dollars in potential capital expenditure at high risk.

Australia should be increasing investment in oil and gas, both to strengthen our sovereign capability and reinforce our energy security partnership with Asia, which relies on Australian LNG while supplying Australia with liquid fuels. Now would be the worst possible time to impose new taxes on an essential energy industry and signal to the world that Australia is closed for business.

¹ Australian Energy Producers, [Financial Survey 2025](#), 2025.

² See Australian Taxation Office, [2023-24 Report of Entity Tax Information](#), update 2 October 2025; [Taxation Statistics](#).

³ Australian Taxation Office, [ATO collects \\$100 billion from large corporates](#), media release, 1 November 2024; [Demographics of large corporate groups](#), 2 October 2025.

⁴ Commonwealth Treasury, [Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2025-26](#), p. 62.

⁵ Pat Bustamante, [Westpac IQ: Still the lucky country: Conflict, Gold and Inflation to Lift the Budget](#), 31 March 2026.

Recommendation

Australian Energy Producers urges the Committee to reject any proposed increase in taxation on Australia's oil and gas industry. The PRRT has been extensively reviewed 6 times in 18 years and was amended as recently as 2024 to deliver more revenue sooner. Stable and internationally competitive tax settings are essential to ensuring additional investment in new and expanded projects that underpin Australia's energy security, prosperity, industrial capacity and highly skilled jobs.

COMMENTS

Reliable and affordable oil and natural gas is essential to Australia's energy security, economic prosperity and strategic partnerships. The Minister for Resources has emphasised that Australia's oil and gas industry underpins the nation's economic development, powering Australian industry, cities, towns and homes. The Minister has also pointed out that "every Australian receives a dividend from our energy exports" and highlighted "Australia's significant role in ensuring that our regional neighbours enjoy energy security".⁶ Further, the development of power-hungry data centres will further expand the role of natural gas, with the International Energy Agency projecting that globally, gas and renewables take the lead in meeting additional data-centre electricity demand to 2030.⁷

The US-Iran conflict has brought Australia's vulnerability to oil supply shocks into focus. Australia ceased to be self-sufficient in oil in the early 2000s, as production from mature basins declined and import dependence began to rise sharply.⁸ Australia now imports approximately 90% of its liquid fuels, leaving the nation acutely exposed to global supply disruptions despite possessing abundant undeveloped resources.⁹ Energy security is inseparable from national security; and the best strategic oil reserve Australia could have is the development of own oil resources, both onshore and offshore.

ATO data demonstrate that the Australian oil and gas industry pays its fair share. The ATO's latest corporate tax transparency report confirms that the oil and gas industry remains one of Australia's largest corporate taxpayers, contributing \$10.4 billion in company tax alone in 2023-24 – approximately 1 in 10 dollars of company tax paid by large corporates (\$96 billion). Eight of the twenty-five largest company taxpayers were oil and gas companies.¹⁰ The ATO noted that "Australia has some of the highest levels of tax compliance of large business in the world", and that 2023-24 was the third year in a row in which the resources sector (which includes oil and gas) paid more tax than all other sectors combined.¹¹ The trends identified by the ATO are consistent with the results of Australian Energy Producers' broader *Financial Survey 2025*, which estimated that for 2024-25, the Australian oil and gas industry paid a \$21.9 billion in taxes and royalties, including approximately \$14.8 billion in company tax and PRRT and approximately \$6.6 billion in royalties, excise and fees (federal and state).

⁶ The Hon Madeleine King MP, Minister for Resources and Minister for Northern Australia, [Speech to the Australian Energy Producers Conference](#), 27 May 2025.

⁷ International Energy Agency, [Energy and AI](#), 10 April 2025, p. 14.

⁸ RS Blewett (ed.), [Shaping a Nation: A Geology of Australia](#), Geoscience Australia and ANU E Press, Canberra, 2012, p. 176.

⁹ Geoscience Australia, [Australia's Energy Commodity Resources 2025: Oil](#), last updated 23 October 2025

¹⁰ Australian Taxation Office, [Large companies continue to pay record levels of tax](#), 2 October 2025; Australian Government, [2023-24 Report of Entity Tax Information](#), updated 2 October 2025.

¹¹ Australian Taxation Office, [Large companies continue to pay record levels of tax](#), 2 October 2025. NB that the ATO corporate tax transparency report does not capture state and territory royalties, payroll tax, goods and services tax, fringe benefits tax, other industry-specific levies, or taxes paid through incorporated joint venture. And while the ATO notes that depreciation and the carry-forward of losses can legitimately reduce taxable income, the Corporate Tax Transparency dataset itself does not show the effect of these features on reported tax payable.

The Petroleum Resource Rent Tax is only one part of the industry’s significant tax contribution. PRRT is a 40% tax levied on the taxable profits of petroleum projects in Commonwealth waters, including offshore oil, gas and condensate. PRRT is designed to balance, as the Callaghan Review put it:

“[T]he need to deliver an equitable return to the community for the use of its resources while ensuring industry has a sufficient incentive to take on risk and invest in projects.”¹²

This is why PRRT is not payable until a project has recovered all its costs and achieved a defined economic return. The oil and gas industry is characterised by high exploration and reservoir risk, high upfront exploration and development costs, long lead times to profitability, and intense international competition for capital. Oil and gas projects take an average of 8 to 12 years of development and production until a break-even point is reached.

PRRT settings were comprehensively assessed by the Callaghan Review and major reforms were legislated in 2024. According to Treasury, the capping of PRRT deductible expenditure to the value of 90% of each taxpayer’s PRRT assessable receipts (effective 1 July 2023) brought forward \$2.4 billion in cash receipts between 2023-24 and 2026-27.¹³ Additionally, the PRRT was retrospectively amended to effectively legislate a narrower interpretation of deductible exploration expenditure to 2013, against broader interpretations relied on by taxpayers in disputes and upheld by the Full Federal Court.¹⁴

The oil and gas industry makes significant tax contributions to state and territory governments, in addition to the Commonwealth. Australia’s onshore petroleum resources are owned by the Crown in right of the states and territories, and state royalties are the primary mechanism through which the residents of those jurisdictions receive a direct return. The industry pays substantial state royalties alongside Commonwealth company income tax, PRRT and other charges. Royalties are generally levied on the volume or value of production, meaning payments automatically increase with stronger commodity prices and higher production volumes. In Queensland, for example, onshore oil and gas producers – including coal seam gas operators – are major royalty payers, providing a significant and recurring revenue stream for the state across the commodity cycle.

The Australian oil and gas industry is the most productive in Australia, contributing more than \$100 billion to the Australian economy each year. 3.7% of Australia’s gross domestic product comes from the oil and gas industry’s direct economic contribution, with over 215,000 Australian jobs supported along the gas supply chain. KPMG analysis shows that the average full-time-equivalent (FTE) worker in the gas industry produces \$2.8 million of gross value-added – approximately 16 times the Australian average of \$181,000 per FTE worker.¹⁵

LNG exports boost national income and support domestic energy security. The industry’s productiveness underpins Australia’s comparative advantage in LNG exports. LNG is Australia’s third-largest export, contributing \$65 billion in 2024-25.¹⁶ More than \$400 billion has been invested in Australia’s LNG industry since 2010, with access to export markets providing the scale needed to develop Australia’s abundant gas resources and ensure reliable gas supply for Australian homes and

¹² Australian Government, [Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Review \(Callaghan Review\) - Final Report](#), 13 April 2017, p. 63.

¹³ The Hon Dr Jim Chalmers MP, Treasurer, [Changes to the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax](#), 2 May 2023.

¹⁴ [Treasury Laws Amendment \(Tax Accountability and Fairness\) Act 2024; Treasury Laws Amendment \(Delivering Better Financial Outcomes and Other Measures\) Act 2024 \(No 67, 2024\)](#).

¹⁵ KPMG, [Economic Contribution of the Gas Industry](#), 2025.

¹⁶ Department of Industry, Science and Resources, [Resources and Energy Quarterly](#), December 2025, p. 14.

industry. As the Gas Market Review Report observes: “Establishing an LNG export industry has enabled the development of gas resources that would otherwise not be commercially viable, providing Australia with energy security.”¹⁷ Wood Mackenzie forecasts global LNG demand to rise 58% by 2050, with the Asia-Pacific’s share of demand rising from 63% to 75%.¹⁸ Australia is ideally placed to meet this growing demand.

In times of geopolitical instability, the energy security benefits of our two-way trade and investment relationships are heightened. While Australia is a net exporter of LNG, with most exports going to Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, Australia is a net importer of liquid fuels, with our largest suppliers being Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, India and Brunei. Australia imports approximately 370-400 million barrels of liquid fuels a year and exports approximately 100-110 million barrels a year to Singapore, China and South Korea, owing to our proximity and refinery specifications.¹⁹ Australia is particularly reliant on diesel and jet fuel imports – critical fuels for economic activity.

There is a strong relationship between international investment in Australia’s LNG industry, our successful export trade, and the mutual energy security of Australia and our trading and investment partners. For example, Japan has been a leading investor in Australia’s LNG export industry since the 1980s, and Australia supplies more than 40 per cent of Japan’s LNG.²⁰ Similarly, South Korea is a significant investor in Australian LNG, and Australia supplies more than 30 per cent of South Korea’s LNG.²¹ China, Malaysia and Taiwan also invest in Australian LNG, and Australia supplies approximately 34%, 80% and 34% of their LNG import volumes, respectively.²² Imposing additional taxation on Australia’s oil and gas industry would undermine Australia’s longstanding reputation as a reliable and trusted trading partner at the worst possible time (Box 1).

Box 1: Prime Minister on proposal to increase taxation of LNG exports

I think it needs to be viewed in the context of where we are now. So, one of the things that we’ve been very clear about, for example, is that just as we expect countries that supply us to stick to agreements which are there, we think it’s very important that the contracts that we have be fulfilled completely with countries in our region. That’s the quid pro quo, if you like. And I think that is very important as we go forward. So, to be clear, our first priority is supply. Supply depends upon those relationships being adhered to. And some of the commentary that is there ignores a whole range of the issues. They take some select areas, pretend that there isn’t a return to the Australian people from the resources sector which is there, which is a real strength for us.²³

¹⁷ Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water and Department of Industry, Science and Resources, *Gas Market Review Report*, 22 December 2025, p.

¹⁸ Wood Mackenzie, [Australia’s Natural Gas Investment Competitiveness](#), prepared for Australian Energy Producers, May 2025, p. 12.

¹⁹ See Department of Industry, Science and Resources, [Resources and Energy Quarterly](#), December 2025; and Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, [Energy Trade](#); DCCEEW, [Australian Petroleum Statistics 2025](#).

²⁰ Australian Embassy in Japan, [Australia-Japan resources and energy relationship](#), viewed 9 April 2026.

²¹ Takeo Kumagai and Charles Lee, [South Korea sees no LNG shortages despite Middle East supply disruptions](#), S&P Global, 5 March 2026.

²² World Bank, [China Natural gas, liquefied imports by country in 2024](#), World Integrated Trade Solution; World Bank, [Malaysia Natural gas, liquefied imports by country in 2024](#), World Integrated Trade Solution; US Energy Information Administration, [Taiwan Analysis Brief](#), last updated April 2026, p. 15.

²³ The Hon Anthony Albanese MP, Prime Minister of Australia, [Question and Answer - National Press Club](#), Canberra, transcript, 2 April 2026.

A new 25% export levy would make many Australian gas projects uneconomic, sharply reduce investment, materially damage Australia’s fiscal competitiveness and elevate sovereign risk, not only for oil and gas investment but for all sectors of the Australian economy. Australia’s existing tax settings already give the Commonwealth a strong and progressive share of resource revenues. As Wood Mackenzie explains (appendix), the current combination of company tax and PRRT (or state royalties for onshore projects) captures a substantial portion of profits and automatically increases the government’s take when prices rise. This means that the fiscal system already delivers more revenue in high-price environments without the need for additional windfall mechanisms. Conversely, the proposed 25% export levy would push the effective tax rate on a representative offshore gas project to as high as 83% at US\$120 a barrel, eroding 94% of project value and fundamentally altering the economics of future supply. Further, an export levy on onshore gas projects would tax a resource not owned by the Commonwealth and one that is already taxed by the states and territories, who do own the resource.

The consequences for investment would be severe with gas supply curtailed and consumers increasingly reliant on higher-cost imports. Wood Mackenzie finds that at a long-run oil price of US\$70 a barrel a 25% export levy could make currently viable projects uninvestable. Under this scenario, projects would only meet commerciality thresholds if long-term oil prices were significantly higher than typically assumed. Australian upstream gas projects expected to take final investment decision in coming years could become uneconomic, reducing future gas supply by 19,000 PJs and placing up to A\$70.4 billion in future government revenue at risk.

International experience shows these risks are measurable and material. The UK’s Energy Profits Levy provides a clear warning: successive changes to the levy have created fiscal instability, triggering a measurable contraction in investment across the UK Continental Shelf. Capital expenditure has fallen sharply, with billions of pounds in planned investment now at risk of being redirected to more competitive jurisdictions. The Wood Mackenzie report makes clear that Australia risks repeating this pattern. Introducing an export levy would significantly worsen Australia’s fiscal competitiveness at a time when global capital is increasingly mobile and when long-term energy security – both for Australia and our trading partners – depends on continued investment in new supply.

While international gas prices have surged, the Australian gas market remains well supplied, and prices remain stable and comparatively low. East coast spot prices remain at their lowest levels in years, with international LNG spot prices around 2½ times higher. Australia’s strong domestic gas market means we remain insulated from the worst of the global energy crisis. Conversely, if Australian gas consumers were reliant on LNG imports, then the price would be more than A\$25 a gigajoule, compared to a domestic price of approximately A\$10 a gigajoule.²⁴ Nonetheless, as the Gas Market Review emphasised, competitive domestic gas and electricity prices depend on new supply, which in turns necessitates ongoing investment facilitated by regulatory clarity, stability and efficiency.²⁵

Norway and Qatar are not meaningful benchmarks for Australia’s tax-only regime. In assessing Australia’s taxation of oil and gas resources, it is essential to recognise the fundamental differences between Australia and competitor jurisdictions such as Norway and Qatar. These countries operate

²⁴ See EnergyQuest, [Recent international and domestic gas price movements](#), 9 April 2026; [Recent international and domestic gas price movements](#), 26 March 2026; [Recent international and domestic gas price movements](#), 13 March 2026.

²⁵ Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water and Department of Industry, Science and Resources, [Gas Market Review Report](#), 22 December 2025, p. 5.

fiscal systems built on state ownership, state capital and mechanisms that share downside risk with investor companies. For example, Norway refunds losses to oil and gas companies with no taxable income. It is misleading to judge Australia against radically different models, which have distinguishing features that our tax-only framework does not replicate (Box 2).

Box 2: Australia’s oil and gas tax regime differs fundamentally from Norway’s and Qatar’s

Norway co-invests and participates in its oil and gas industry. While Norway taxes net income from oil and gas at a headline rate of 78%, it shares downside risk by allowing companies to write off large upfront capital costs immediately for the petroleum tax calculation, and refunding the tax value of losses. Further, the Norwegian state owns 67% of Equinor ASA, which accounts for 70% of all oil and gas production on the Norwegian shelf, and directly participates in petroleum activities through its State Direct Financial Interest mechanism and its licensee Petoro AS. Through both direct participation and its tax system, Norway shares project costs and risks upfront, rather than leaving companies to bear early-stage losses alone, as is the case in Australia.

Qatar typically takes a large ownership stake in oil and gas projects through its national company, QatarEnergy. Because the government earns revenue through this ownership, rather than relying only on taxes, private investors face lower upfront costs and risks. While Qatar does not refund tax losses like Norway, its equity participation means the government shares both costs and profits in proportion to its stake. Qatar also maintains relatively low tax rates and has low production costs, contributing to its strong competitiveness.

In contrast, Australia relies more on taxation and places the bulk of upfront project risks on the private sector. Australia imposes a 30% company tax and 40% PRRT (for offshore projects in Commonwealth waters), as well as state royalties (for onshore projects); yet costs can only be deducted and losses carried forward over time. This means that tax benefits under the Australian fiscal regime are more delayed and less certain than in Norway and Qatar.

Increasing gas taxation would undermine the Gas Market Review’s objective of encouraging long-term investment through regulatory stability and efficiency. The Gas Market Review concluded that “fundamental reform is needed” to establish “a more efficient, streamlined regulatory framework supported by complementary measures”, and to “improve investor confidence by establishing clear, predictable, and transparent market settings, supporting supply security in the long term”.²⁶ Introducing a blunt, costly and retrospective tax on LNG exports would preclude these desired outcomes.

²⁶ Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water and Department of Industry, Science and Resources, [Gas Market Review Report](#), 22 December 2025, pp. 5, 89.

Analysis of proposed LNG export windfall levy: potential impact on energy project economics and fiscal competitiveness

Executive summary

With the Federal Government's Future Gas Strategy making clear the critical, long-term role for gas to support the decarbonisation of power generation and the continuation of local industry in this country, the need to encourage investment in the development of Australia's gas resources is obvious and pressing.

Upstream oil and gas companies invest in projects to generate a return commensurate with the risk level of the investment. Upstream oil and gas exploration and production is inherently higher risk than other capital-intensive investments such as infrastructure projects, as upstream projects are subject to highly uncertain production outcomes and the volatility common in global oil and gas markets. For companies to invest, they must be able to balance upside value generated by higher prices with the downside risk of lower prices or higher operating costs.

The Australian government is being urged to impose a 25% windfall levy on Australian energy production or exports, nominally to combat rising domestic energy costs as a result of the conflict in the Middle East, and to increase Government take from "windfall gas profits". The Commonwealth Treasury is understood to be modelling options for a new levy on gas exports as part of the upcoming federal budget. How this proposed tax may be levied is not yet clear, though some media reports indicate it could be applied to LNG export profits, LNG export revenue or corporate profit.

Australia's existing fiscal terms already allow government to capture substantial share of profits from Australian oil and gas projects, with a current effective tax rate of approximately 53.5% to 57.5%. The current corporate income tax (CIT) and Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) framework is also inherently a progressive, profit-based tax that captures additional tax revenue for government when prices increase.

The addition of a 25% windfall levy on LNG exports could increase Total Government Share (the effective tax rate of a project) to as high as 83% (at US\$120/bbl), and erode nearly all positive value of a representative offshore gas field development (94% reduction)¹.

All potential windfall tax mechanisms modelled in this analysis result in an increased effective tax rate, and reduction in investment returns, on a scale that could make Australia's oil and gas projects uninvestable at the long-term Brent oil price that underpins investment decisions (~US\$70/bbl).

The full lifecycle investment returns of the upstream gas projects in Australia forecast to take FID in the next few years could be materially reduced, potentially making them uninvestable and putting up to A\$70.4bn (US\$51bn) of Government income under the existing tax regime at risk. Together these projects represent total 2P Reserves of 18 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas (~19,000 PJ) – the equivalent of more than 300 million tonnes of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) – and 1 billion barrels of liquids (including oil, condensates and natural gas liquids). If these projects do not proceed, the impact on Australia's energy security, the energy security of our trading partners – who are significant investors in Australia's energy industry – and foregone Government taxation revenue would be material. It would also impact the availability of domestic gas supplies, impact the longevity and valuations of Australia's existing LNG facilities and increase perceived sovereign risk for LNG trading partners.

At a broader level, the addition of a windfall tax to Australia's fiscal terms would reduce competitiveness with peer regimes, reducing Australia's fiscal attractiveness for potential investors. The export levy structure in particular would make Australia the least fiscally attractive regime of all peer countries, significantly impacting its ability to attract and retain investment in upstream oil and gas production.

Examples of other windfall taxes in comparable countries have demonstrated the negative effects on investment in oil and gas production. The cumulative effect of the UK Energy Profits Levy and its subsequent modifications has been a measurable contraction in UK Continental Shelf investment activity. This includes a significant reduction in expected capital expenditure on the UKCS relative to pre-EPL trajectories, with billions of pounds of investment at risk of being redirected to more competitive jurisdictions. While Norway's fiscal regime is frequently referenced to advocate for an increase in headline tax rates, the structure of Norway's fiscal regime differs substantially from the UK and Australia. Norway directly and indirectly owns and participates in Norway's oil and gas industry and projects, taking on project and development risk through its direct equity holdings in projects and development companies. This means the Norwegian Government shares both the upside of higher prices with the downside of lower prices, higher costs and material shares of technical and non-technical risks.

¹ Reduction in Net Present Value (NPV) on an NPV10 basis.

Introduction

The Australian government is being urged to impose a 25% windfall levy on Australian energy production or exports, nominally to combat rising domestic energy costs as a result of the conflict in the Middle East, and to increase Government take from "windfall gas profits". The Commonwealth Treasury is understood to be modelling options for a new levy on gas exports as part of the upcoming federal budget. How this proposed tax may be levied is not yet clear, though some media reports indicate it could be applied to LNG export profits, LNG export revenue or corporate profit.

Wood Mackenzie has modelled the impact of the potential windfall levy on post-tax project economics in Australia and has used the results to assess the corresponding implications for Australia's fiscal attractiveness and competitiveness relative to peer regimes.

Potential windfall levy mechanisms

In Australia, upstream oil and gas exploration and production licences are awarded under concession terms through licensing rounds and direct negotiation. All oil and gas projects are subject to a corporate income tax on profits at a rate of 30%.

For onshore projects (under State jurisdiction) royalty rates vary from 10% to 12.5% depending on which State the block is located in. Excise duties can range from 0% to 55% for oil and condensate, with an exemption for the first 30 million barrels produced.

Offshore projects located more than three nautical miles from the baseline (under Federal jurisdiction) are exempt from royalties and excise duties, with the exception of North West Shelf which is subject to Federal royalties. These projects are subject to and pay Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) at a rate of 40%. Additionally, offshore projects pay an offshore petroleum levy to recover the costs of decommissioning and remediating the Laminaria and Corallina oilfields and associated infrastructure, charged at A\$0.48/bbl for all offshore production. Based on a representative offshore gas project, current fiscal terms in Australia result in a Total Government Share of profit generated (the effective tax rate of a project) of 53.8% at a US\$70/bbl Brent oil price.

In addition to these taxes, the federal government is reportedly considering an additional windfall levy on Australian energy producers, with initial discussions focused on levying the tax on LNG exports. While the exact mechanism of the potential windfall tax remains unclear, Wood Mackenzie has considered the mechanisms proposed publicly as well as considering comparable regimes that have adopted similar mechanisms. A range of scenarios for the potential levy have been developed and modelled:

1. An **export levy** – 25% tax on LNG export revenue;
2. A **windfall profit tax** – 25% tax on surplus taxable profits (Earnings Before Interest and Tax – EBIT);
3. A **windfall revenue tax** – 25% tax on surplus gross revenue; and
4. An **increase in the Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate** – 25% tax increase in CIT rate (current 30% plus an additional 25%).

'Surplus' taxable profit and 'surplus' gross revenue are calculated as any EBIT or revenue (respectively) earned above that generated at a base reference price for Brent oil of US\$70/bbl.

Modelling assumptions & methodology

Our analysis relies on several generalised model inputs and assumptions, including the mechanism applied to calculate the windfall levy; the representative analogue project (i.e., production & cost profile used as a proxy for a potential investment opportunity); macroeconomic factors; and fiscal regimes. Detailed assumptions are provided as Appendix 1 of this analysis.

To avoid introducing project-specific factors and to ensure comparability with other fiscal structures, a standardised hydrocarbon development analogue is used as the basis of our calculations of project economics. To ensure relevance to Australia, we have selected a proxy for a large-scale offshore gas asset as our analogue. The asset characteristics include a reserve size of 4 tcf, peak gas production of 450 million standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd) and an operational life of 27 years.

Other broad assumptions that underpin our analysis include that the windfall levy is permanent (i.e., there is no expiry of the windfall levy throughout the project life). To estimate export revenue, we assume that a given project exports 85% of total volumes, with 15% sold into the domestic gas market. Only the export revenue will serve as the basis of the export levy.

For both the windfall revenue and windfall profit taxes, we estimate surplus profits and surplus gross revenue as the difference between EBIT and revenue, respectively, under a base case US\$70/bbl (2026 real terms) scenario

against those under a US\$120/bbl scenario. Further, we assume no offsetting incentives (investment allowances) under the windfall levy mechanism and no fiscal synergies with existing assets – the economics of each development are calculated on a stand-alone basis (i.e. ring-fenced at the project level). For modelling purposes, we assume that the export levy, windfall revenue and windfall profit taxes are not tax deductible for PRRT and CIT calculation purposes.

Impact of the proposed windfall tax on Australian energy projects

At US\$120/bbl Brent oil, imposing a 25% export levy on LNG would result in an effective project tax rate of 83%, and a reduction in the value generated by 94%, effectively eroding nearly all positive value². This could make existing projects and future backfill gas supply projects uninvestable.

Export levy

An export levy applied as a 25% tax on export revenue results in the largest windfall levy generated in absolute dollar terms and is modelled to be the most disruptive to energy project economics. Such a levy would erode nearly all positive value of the analogue offshore gas development in NPV10 terms – value generated is reduced by 94% at a US\$120/bbl Brent oil price as a result of the levy.

Windfall profit tax

Tax on surplus profit also has a considerable impact on the expected value of the modelled asset. At a US\$120/bbl Brent oil price, value generated is reduced by 32% as a result of the levy in NPV10 terms, and IRR is reduced by 2.4%. Total Government Share of profit (the effective tax rate of the investment) rises by 8%, taking it to almost two-thirds of total profit generated.

Windfall revenue tax


Similarly, at a US\$120/bbl Brent oil price, a tax on surplus revenue erodes over half of the projects value, with a 54% decrease in NPV10 terms. As a result, IRR is reduced by 3.9%. Total Government Share of profit (the effective tax rate of the investment) rises by 14% to reach 71% of total profit.

Increase in CIT

Applying a 25% increase in the rate of CIT yields results that are comparable to those of a tax on surplus revenue. The slight differences (lower IRR impact but higher impact on Total Government Share) arise from the timing of CIT – while the increase in CIT rate generates more tax revenues in nominal (undiscounted) terms, a greater portion of CIT is incurred later in the project life.

Impact of a 25% export levy at US\$120/bbl Brent oil

Figure – Breakdown of government share under different windfall levy mechanisms at US\$120/bbl Brent oil price



(1) While the nominal PRRT rate is 40%, the allowable/deductible uplift of E&A and CAPEX by 9.25% (annual interest) lowers the effective PRRT

(2) While Australia's nominal CIT rate is 30%, effective PRRT is deductible for CIT calculation purposes; 30% x (1-38%) = 19% (effective CIT rate)

² Due to a 25% levy on export revenue at a constant US\$120/bbl Brent oil price, when compared to current Australian fiscal terms.

The mechanics of Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT)

Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) is a tax on petroleum production. It is levied at a rate of 40% of gross revenue of hydrocarbons at their point of extraction after consideration of a range of deductions. These deductions include exploration costs, project development and operating costs, and decommissioning costs. These deductions are in place in order to account for the expenditures required to find, extract and transport oil and gas for processing into marketable products (e.g. LNG).

The deductions against PRRT generally mean lower amounts of PRRT are paid early in a project's life, as the capital costs associated with exploration for hydrocarbons, and the construction phase of an upstream development project, are higher than the revenue generated in the early years of production.

For the analysis in this Briefing Note, the effective PRRT rate has been calculated on a full lifecycle basis (i.e., total PRRT payable over the entire operational life of the project divided by total pre-tax cash flow, on an undiscounted basis). This full lifecycle effective rate is sensitive to several underlying assumptions, most notably ring-fencing and the quantum of assessable receipts.

Most important, though, is the assumed price for the purposes of calculating project revenue. Under the US\$120/bbl Brent oil price scenario the project is profitable from the first year of production, causing the accumulated net operating loss (NOL) carried forward (i.e. the deductions of exploration and capital development costs) to largely expire within 3 to 4 years. This reduces the impact of cost augmentation – currently 9.25% per annum on the unutilised balance – reducing the total uplift realised and in turn increasing the effective full lifecycle PRRT rate. Conversely, in a lower price environment, NOLs persist for longer, the uplift mechanism generates greater cumulative deductions, and the effective PRRT rate is correspondingly lower.

For assessable receipts, rather than applying the Residual Pricing Method (RPM) – which averages the netback and cost-plus prices – we have used the downstream netback price as a simplified proxy. Additionally, the economics of the analogue have been calculated on a stand-alone basis, with no fiscal synergies assumed from existing assets.

Table – Change in metrics under different tax mechanisms relative to Australia's current fiscal terms (US\$120/bbl Brent oil price)

	Tax on Surplus Profit (EBIT)	Tax on Surplus Revenue	Increase in CIT	Export Levy
IRR	-2.4%	-3.9%	-3.7%	-7.5%
NPV10	-32%	-54%	-54%	-94%
Change in Government Share	+8%	+14%	+16%	+25%
Total Government Share	65%	71%	73%	83%

Impact on Total Government Share

In all scenarios, Total Government Share increases from the current 57% at US\$120/bbl to as high as 83% for the export levy structure. However, the way in which Total Government Share changes as prices change is different across the different structures. The intention of a windfall tax in general is to capture a greater tax share of profits generated from high prices. However, some of the structures modelled in this analysis actually result in a regressive tax structure. This decreases Total Government Share as prices increase and increases Total Government Share as prices decrease, introducing significant downside risk for project proponents given the volatile nature of oil and gas markets.

Flat taxes on revenue (such as the export levy) are regressive

A flat 25% export levy has been specifically proposed as a potential mechanism. However, this is a regressive tax which would lead to lower effective tax rates when product prices increase, and higher rates when prices decrease. This is due to the nature of revenue-based taxation, where increases in revenue do not scale directly with profit.

The impact of a regressive tax on an industry such as oil and gas production is significant. The exploration for, and production of, oil and gas is inherently high risk. Projects are capital-intensive with long lead times, and the volatile nature of oil and gas markets mean a high range of uncertainty associated with future cashflows. This risk is balanced with the potential for upside value capture during periods of elevated commodity prices. A regressive tax significantly impacts this balance – Total Government Share would increase at lower commodity prices, which erodes project returns, increases downside risk and reduces overall investability of a given project.

Windfall or ‘surplus’ taxes may be progressive or regressive, depending on project economics


While a tax on surplus revenue appears to be progressive under our modelled scenarios, the same mechanism can exhibit regressivity under a higher-cost or lower-margin environment. Taxes on surplus revenue can also make an otherwise profitable project uneconomic – when revenue is the sole taxable basis, tax can be substantial in a high price environment regardless of operating margins, potentially resulting in negative post-tax cashflow because of the windfall tax.

While a tax on surplus profit is more likely to retain progressivity, this tax can also be regressive in some cases. A project that generates negative profit under baseline prices and modestly positive profit under ‘windfall prices’ would exhibit regressive properties. In these marginal scenarios, a windfall profit tax may be disproportionately high relative to pre-tax cashflow, leading to a high Total Government Share which then decreases as prices increase.

An increase in CIT dilutes the progressivity of PRRT

CIT is not a regressive tax, but when CIT increases as a proportion of Total Government Share, the progressive impact of PRRT becomes less pronounced, making the tax structure less sensitive to an incremental increase in price. Under Australia’s current fiscal terms, Total Government Share increases from 53.8% to 57.4% (+3.6%) when Brent oil price increases from US\$70 to US\$140/bbl. However, the increased CIT scenario results in Total Government Share only increasing from 71.6% to 73.0% (+1.4%) under the same conditions. This suggests that an increase in the CIT rate will cause Australia’s oil and gas fiscal structure to become less progressive.

Figure – Change in Total Government Share at US\$100, \$120 & \$140 per barrel (relative to current terms with no windfall tax)



Impact on investability


Upstream oil and gas companies invest in projects to generate a return commensurate with the risk level of the investment. Upstream oil and gas exploration and production is inherently higher risk than other investments such as infrastructure projects, as upstream projects are subject to the volatility inherent in global oil and gas markets and must balance upside value generated by higher prices with the downside risk of lower prices or higher operating costs. They are also typically highly capital-intensive, have long lead times, and operate over decades.

Typical hurdle rates for investment in greenfield upstream oil and gas projects can be as much as 15% or more, while brownfield expansion or backfill projects may have slightly lower rates (reflecting their lower risk profiles). Australia’s Federal regulator, the National Offshore Petroleum Titles Administrator (NOPTA), states in the Guideline for Retention Leases that “mid-case nominal after tax IRR of 12% or greater will be considered commercially viable”.

Investments are also predicated on assumptions of long-run oil and LNG prices, which do not incorporate short term volatility – both upside and downside. Whilst projects may appear economic at high oil prices, investors evaluate projects at more conservative long-run prices that reflect long-term market fundamentals. Typically, these valuations are performed at oil prices between US\$65 and US\$75/bbl. This is further reinforced by the fact that current debates on windfall levels of revenue or profit are centred around any revenue or profit generated by oil prices being above US\$70/bbl, implying that US\$70/bbl is a reasonable long-run assumption for Brent oil prices. Indeed, UK’s ‘windfall tax’ Energy Profits Levy has introduced a price floor of US\$71.4/bbl – at or below this price, the Energy Profits Levy is not levied on projects.

At a Brent oil price of US\$70/bbl, the imposition of a 25% export levy would make currently economic projects uninvestable, with full lifecycle IRR’s falling by up to 5.5% under this tax structure. Further, full lifecycle IRRs would fall below NOPTA’s definition of a commercial or investable return (12%) at any Brent oil price up to US\$140/bbl, meaning that investable returns could not be achieved unless long-term oil prices were to remain at or above US\$140/bbl over the project’s lifecycle.


Figure – Comparison of IRR under export levy & CIT-based mechanisms compared with the typical industry hurdle rate range



Windfall taxes aimed at capturing a greater share of ‘surplus’ revenue or profits also reduce investor returns, by limiting potential upside when prices are elevated. Without additional measures being incorporated into the design of fiscal terms to protect against downside risk – for example, allowing immediate expensing of capital expenditure or direct reimbursement of tax deficits – the balance of upside value and downside risk is fundamentally shifted. The exposure to downside risk remains, however the potential for upside value capture is blunted, increasing overall investment risk for project proponents.

As a result, it is likely that project proponents would impose higher hurdle rates on projects to account for the increase in risk presented by fiscal terms that include windfall taxes without additional downside protection. At a Brent oil price of US\$120/bbl, a 25% windfall tax on revenue would reduce IRR by 3.9%, and a 25% windfall tax on EBIT would reduce IRR by 2.4%.

Figure – Comparison of IRR under windfall ‘surplus’ tax mechanisms compared with the typical industry hurdle rate range



Case Study – the United Kingdom Energy Profits Levy (EPL)



The most recent wave of windfall taxes, introduced in 2021–2023 in response to elevated oil, gas, and energy prices following COVID-19 disruptions and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, provide a useful case study to assess the impact that windfall-related modifications may have on overall fiscal attractiveness. Despite their intended purpose of capturing increased profits for the state, many of these mechanisms have produced disappointing and, in some cases, counterproductive outcomes – deterring investment, accelerating asset disposals, and undermining long-term production capacity in exchange for temporary tax revenue gains. The UK’s Energy Profits Levy (EPL) and its impact on upstream investments provides a useful reference.

The UK EPL

The Energy Profits Levy was introduced by the UK government in May 2022 as a 25% surcharge on the profits of oil and gas companies operating on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), due to apply until 2025. Combined with the existing 30% Ring Fence Corporation Tax and 10% Supplementary Charge, the EPL brought the headline marginal tax rate on UKCS profits to 65%. The mechanism also included an 80% investment allowance to incentivise capital spend. This introduction was followed by a series of changes and additions:

- **Increase in EPL rate** to 35% and subsequently to 38%, ultimately raising the combined tax rate to 78%.
- **Reduction of investment allowance** to 29% for oil & gas spend not related to decarbonisation.
- **Extension of the sunset clause to 2030**, to be replaced by a permanent mechanism to tax “excess” profits.


Impact on investment and activity

Each successive modification has added to investor uncertainty, reinforcing a perception that the UKCS fiscal regime is structurally unpredictable and politically exposed. The cumulative effect of the EPL and its subsequent modifications has been a measurable contraction in UKCS investment activity.

This includes a significant reduction in expected capital expenditure on the UKCS relative to pre-EPL trajectories, with billions of pounds of investment at risk of being redirected to more competitive jurisdictions.

The North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA)’s historical data and projections (as of February 2026) indicate a declining trend in total capital expenditure spend since the implementation of EPL (£5.7bn in 2024, £5.0bn in 2025, and £3.8bn in 2026). Additionally, Wood Mackenzie estimates that more than £15bn of potential CAPEX (spend on Pre-FID projects) is at high risk of being cancelled.

Total capital expenditure – UKCS (£ billion)



The UK has also seen cancellations or delays of drilling and development programmes, with major operators citing the deteriorating fiscal environment as a primary driver of reduced exposure to UKCS. For example, Equinor and Harbour Energy, among other international companies, have publicly announced a pivot away from the country to Norway and/or the US and South America.

The result of this fall in investment is a decline in exploration activity on the UKCS to historically low levels, with E&A spend expected to remain constrained going forward. This suggests a reduction in the long-term pipeline of developable resources.

Long-term impacts

By compressing post-tax returns and introducing fiscal uncertainty while offering limited downside protection for investors, windfall tax mechanisms like EPL may deter the long-cycle capital investment that sustains future production, in turn reducing the tax revenue generated from future operational projects. Furthermore, declining domestic production increases dependence on imports, exposing the economy to price volatility and geopolitical risks.

Impact on Australia’s fiscal competitiveness

Fiscal terms in the oil and gas sector represent the specific set of laws, regulations, and contractual agreements that determine how the economic value generated from hydrocarbon production is shared between a host government and a private oil company. These terms define the total percentage of project cash flow retained by the state through various mechanisms such as royalties, corporate income taxes, bonuses, and, in some cases, state participation or production sharing.

Because exploration and production are highly capital-intensive and investments require consideration of long-term returns, fiscal frameworks are designed to balance a country’s need for revenue with the investor’s requirement for a competitive rate of return. Among other project metrics such as geological prospectivity, investors evaluate fiscal terms across jurisdictions as a key input into deciding whether to invest in a given location.


When compared to peer countries that compete with Australia for upstream oil and gas investment, Australia’s current fiscal regime ranks moderately. Among the nine peer countries analysed (Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, PNG, Timor-Leste, Qatar³ and the United States) Australia ranks fifth for investment return (IRR), sixth for total value (NPV10) and seventh for Total Government Share. Among the top three LNG exporters globally (USA, Qatar, Australia), Australia ranks the poorest across all three metrics.

The addition of a new windfall levy will further adversely impact Australia’s relative position, placing it in the bottom quartile of its peers across all three metrics of fiscal attractiveness. While the magnitude of the impact varies by mechanism, the windfall tax would cause Australia’s fiscal competitiveness to fall behind those of its regional peers.


The charts below highlight Australia’s current position relative to peers for each of the key evaluation metrics when considering the standardised analogue offshore gas field development at a US\$120/bbl Brent oil price, along with the potential impact various windfall levy mechanisms may have on competitiveness. For readability, the chart uses short-hand names for the different windfall mechanisms discussed in the preceding sections:

- **Windfall #1:** windfall profit tax – 25% tax on surplus taxable profits (EBIT)
- **Windfall #2:** increase in CIT – 25% tax increase in CIT rate (current 30% + additional 25%)
- **Windfall #3:** windfall revenue tax – 25% tax on surplus gross revenue
- **Windfall #4:** export levy – 25% tax on export revenue

Figure – Australia’s fiscal competitiveness at US\$120/bbl relative to benchmarked peers⁽¹⁾ (with & without windfall tax)⁽²⁾



³ As of 1 January 2026. The impact of the current conflict in the Middle East may affect investment returns and value generated by Qatari energy projects, though this remains to be quantified.



(1) AUS = Australia / USA = United States of America (Gulf of Mexico) / CAN = Canada (British Columbia) / NOR = Norway / QAT = Qatar / PNG = Papua New Guinea / TLS = Timor Leste / NGA = Nigeria / MYS = Malaysia (Deepwater) / IDN = Indonesia (Profit Sharing Contract)

(2) Assessment based on Wood Mackenzie's existing database of benchmark countries' fiscal terms; results based on the assumed analogue and macroeconomic inputs (high-price environment (Brent price of \$120/bbl)); for details on how surplus profit/revenue are calculated, refer Appendix 1

(3) Norway's State Equity can vary between 0% and 30% via State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI). For simplification of the analysis, Total State Share comparisons exclude the impact of SDFI and other forms of ownership (i.e., via Equinor). Details of the mechanism are provided in the "Norway Special Tax" analysis in this Briefing Note. Norway has a cash-based tax system ("Special Tax") which contributes to a wide divergence in ranking (i.e., high ranking for IRR coupled with low ranking for NPV10 and total government share). The

As can be seen, the addition of a windfall tax to Australia's fiscal terms would reduce competitiveness with peer regimes, reducing Australia's fiscal attractiveness for potential investors. The export levy structure in particular would make Australia the least fiscally attractive regime of all peer countries, significantly impacting its ability to attract and retain investment in upstream oil and gas production.


Additionally, when considering the attractiveness of a fiscal regime, investors also place importance on the relative stability of those fiscal terms. The long-term nature of oil and gas investment means that developers place a high value on the predictability of long-term cashflows. In many cases, stability of terms can be more important than the overall attractiveness of those terms. Frequent or negative changes to fiscal terms can lead investors to place a higher risk premium on investments within a regime, as there is lower certainty in their long-term stability.

Wood Mackenzie's Fiscal Stability Index is a tool used to assess and compare the stability of fiscal regimes in different countries or regions for the oil and gas industry. The index aims to measure how stable and predictable a country's fiscal regime is for oil and gas investments over time. The index considers various factors that contribute to fiscal stability, which include the frequency of changes to fiscal terms, the magnitude of changes when they occur, the predictability of changes, transparency in the process of changing fiscal terms, adherence to contracts and agreements, political stability and its impact on fiscal policies and the historical track record of fiscal changes.

Since 2002, Australia has made several significant changes to its fiscal terms for upstream oil and gas projects, which have had various impacts on investment returns. This included the changes to the PRRT in 2012, the PRRT Review and Reforms between 2016 and 2019, the introduction of a PRRT deductions cap for LNG producers in 2023, and the introduction of a Decommissioning Cost Recovery levy in 2021.

As a result, Australia's current fiscal stability is considered to be lower than all peer countries with the exception of the United Kingdom, who's fiscal stability has been eroded by the introduction of, and subsequent changes to, the UK EPL. The introduction of a windfall tax in Australia would further reduce Australia's fiscal stability.

Figure – Number of Historical Fiscal Changes x WM Fiscal Stability Index Matrix (Australia, Peer Countries, UK)



Australia’s increased tax take during high-price periods, compared with other jurisdictions


Preserving the government’s fair share of resource revenues and maintaining a competitive investment environment are not mutually exclusive. Several jurisdictions have fiscal mechanisms that capture resource rent effectively across the commodity cycle without the structural drawbacks of retrospective windfall levies.

In fact, Australia’s existing fiscal terms already allow government to capture substantial upside during high-price environments – even without a windfall tax mechanism. The existing CIT and PRRT-based terms constitute a progressive, profit-based tax structure that captures additional tax revenue when prices increase. This is demonstrated by the change in Total Government Share of Australia’s existing fiscal regime when increasing average realised oil price.

Other jurisdictions such as Norway also use progressive taxation to capture additional value upside when prices rise, but the structure of this tax also includes downside protections and lower upfront costs that improve investor returns when compared with a windfall tax.

Conversely, regimes with direct state participation on an equity basis utilise regressive fixed royalties on a revenue basis. However, this is combined with significant state participation, meaning that the government shares the risk and capital costs of development as well as sharing in any additional value capture from higher prices. This both reduces risk and improves returns for private oil and gas companies in these regimes, as the government relies less on taxation and royalties, and more on their equity participation to drive state revenue.

Figure – Change in Total Government Share as oil prices increase (relative to share at US\$70/bbl)



Norway: high levels of State participation, with a cashflow-based tax and structural downside protection supporting upside capture



Norway's fiscal regime is frequently referenced to advocate for an increase in headline tax rates – its combined corporate income tax and Special Tax rate of 78% has been used to justify, for example, the UK's latest increase in EPL (the revised EPL rate of 38%, when combined with the Ring Fence Corporation Tax of 30% and Supplementary Charge of 10%, results in a combined headline rate of 78%).

However, the structure of Norway's fiscal regime differs substantially from the UK and Australia. **Norway directly and indirectly owns and participates in Norway's oil and gas industry and projects.** Equinor ASA is an international energy company that accounts for 70% of all oil and gas production on the Norwegian shelf. The Norwegian state owns 67% of the shares in Equinor ASA, and this share is managed by government ministries. Additionally, Norway directly participates in petroleum activities through its State Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) mechanism and its licensee Petoro AS. Petoro's main objective in managing the SDFI shares in production licenses and fields is to create the highest possible value and maximize state revenues from the portfolio.

In addition, while the headline rate of Norway's Special Tax is 78%, the mechanics of the tax differ fundamentally from a windfall levy such as the UK EPL or those proposed in Australia. In 2022, Norway's Special Tax was converted to a cash flow tax, allowing the immediate expensing of all capital expenditure (i.e., full depreciation of CAPEX incurred each year). Furthermore, companies that do not have any taxable income receive direct reimbursement of the special tax value of their deficit rather than being required to carry losses forward against uncertain future income.

Under this structure, the **Norwegian state effectively participates in project economics symmetrically, sharing downside risk in direct proportion to its tax take on the upside**, with its tax revenues adjusting automatically in line with project profitability and commodity market conditions. In practice, this mechanism achieves the following:

- **Higher investor IRR & downside protection:** Immediate expensing of CAPEX and direct reimbursement of Special Tax losses allow investors to effectively incur lower upfront costs (and in turn reduced risk), materially benefiting companies with high hurdle rates. The pre-production cost refund shortens the payback period and enhances returns on a risk-adjusted basis.
- **Upside capture for the government:** Once a project achieves profitability and CAPEX requirements decrease, the 78% marginal rate helps allocate a substantial majority of positive cash flow to the state. From the investor's perspective, Norway's structure reduces the overall "scale" of the investment.
- **Fiscal deterrence:** By dynamically calibrating the state's take to actual project economics, the regime structurally reduces the incentive for reactive fiscal intervention during periods of commodity price surges and downturns. This renders intervention like fiscal incentives (i.e., investment allowances) or windfall taxes less necessary.

The Norwegian fiscal regime is fundamentally different from that in Australia. The ability to transition from Australia's current fiscal structure to one similar to that in Norway is difficult. Norway operates with a high level of state participation, leverages Equinor's position as a major global oil and gas company and also operates a non-profit gas transportation network in the country. Additionally, Norway's gas is mostly exported via pipeline to European neighbours, which is significantly lower cost and lower risk than exporting to market via LNG.

Transitioning from a capped deduction structure under PRRT to the immediate deduction of capital expenditure in the Norwegian structure, for example, could result in large amounts of un-deducted historic capital expenditure being immediately fully depreciated.

Qatar: risk-sharing via state equity participation with no or limited carry obligations



With an automatic right to take equity in any commercial discovery, QatarEnergy typically participates directly as the dominant equity partner in domestic assets (a few exceptions include Pearl GTL and Bunduq). While Wood Mackenzie has conservatively modelled Qatar's state equity share as 40% (in line with our understanding of the provisions related to QatarEnergy's right to take equity), QatarEnergy's negotiated stake in projects often exceeds 60%. While some investors prefer greater ownership and operatorship, this partnership structure allows Qatar to maintain a relatively simple and attractive set of fiscal terms, with the government capturing a substantial portion of project cashflows via QatarEnergy's working interest in the asset, as opposed to relying solely on royalty and tax (in our model, Qatar's state equity constitutes 31% of its total undiscounted state share). Furthermore, Wood Mackenzie understands that there are no pre-production carry obligations under the regime, meaning that QatarEnergy assumes its equity portion of cash outflows in the development stage of the project.

High state equity with no development CAPEX carry obligations translates to lower upfront capital requirements and risks for the private investor. While the fiscal system does not provide direct reimbursement for tax losses like Norway, and has regressive taxes (royalties), QatarEnergy's equity co-participation ensures that the government shares both downside risk and upside potential in proportion to its ownership stake. Qatar is also the lowest cost producer of gas and LNG in the world, providing opportunity for higher profitability and increased fiscal attractiveness for investors.

The NOC is exposed to the same cost overruns and commodity price cycles as the private investor, creating an alignment required for efficient project delivery and long-run commercial success. Additionally, Qatar's attractive fiscal terms (i.e., relatively low combined tax rate) lead to a high overall fiscal competitiveness. Wood Mackenzie's comparative fiscal analysis reflects this, with Qatar ranked in the top three or four among peers across the IRR, NPV10, and Total Government Share (excluding state equity) metrics.

A high degree of state ownership and direct government involvement also yield other benefits, including operational stability, access to regulatory and physical/infrastructure networks, technical capacity and institutional knowledge, among others. Each of these factors contribute to enhanced risk management from the private investor's perspective (i.e., downside protection), while the government's direct participation ensures a "fair share" of upside value capture under high-price and/or low-cost environments.

Similar to the Norwegian fiscal regime, **Qatar operates with a high level of direct State participation in oil and gas projects through its large state-owned oil and gas companies. This is in contrast to Australia, which does not participate in projects and does not have a National Oil Company or state-owned developer that would allow this kind of fiscal structure to operate effectively.**

The potential impacts of a windfall levy on Australia's oil and gas industry

With the Federal Government's Future Gas Strategy making clear the critical, long-term role for gas to support the decarbonisation of power generation and the continuation of local industry in this country, the need to encourage investment in the development of Australia's gas resources is obvious and pressing.

We model that the most recently sanctioned offshore gas to LNG backfill projects in Australia took FID with full lifecycle IRRs of between 9% and 13% under existing Australian fiscal terms. As outlined in the analysis, the impact of an export levy could potentially reduce project IRR (at US\$70/bbl) by 5.5%. This reduction would likely make these projects uninvestable, with full lifecycle IRR falling to as low as 3.5%. The impact of this on Australia's energy security, the energy security of our trading partners, and foregone Government taxation revenue would be material.

Wood Mackenzie estimates that upstream gas projects in Australia forecast to take FID in the next few years could generate A\$151.8bn (US\$110bn) in cumulative pre-tax nominal cashflow. Of this, Total Government Share is estimated to total approximately A\$70.4bn (US\$51bn) (cumulative post-tax nominal cashflow net to Government) under current fiscal terms. These projects are also estimated to have full lifecycle IRRs of between 9% and 18% - the addition of an export levy could reduce these returns to as low as 4.5% to 12.5%⁴, potentially making them uninvestable and putting up to A\$70.4bn of Government income at risk.

Together these projects represent total 2P Reserves of 18 tcf (~19,000 PJ) of natural gas – the equivalent of more than 300 million tonnes of LNG – and 1 billion barrels of liquids (including oil, condensates and natural gas liquids). If these projects do not proceed, the impact on Australia's energy security, the energy security of our trading partners – who are significant investors in Australia's energy industry – and foregone Government taxation revenue would be material.

⁴ Estimated, based on the reduction in IRR observed for the analogue development analysed in this Briefing Note, which may not exactly match the profiles of these individual pre-FID projects.

Given the backfill nature of these projects, it would also impact the longevity and valuations of Australia's existing LNG liquefaction facilities as a result of constrained upstream gas supplies and shortened economic lives. Additional impacts could also include an increase in perceived sovereign risk for LNG trading partners and lower economic activity as a result of projects not proceeding.

It would also impact the availability of domestic gas supplies, particularly in the West Australia domestic gas market given its reliance on LNG exporter domestic gas commitments and the need for new supply to enter the market from the end of this decade in order to keep the market sufficiently supplied.

Appendix 1 – detailed assumptions and methodology

Development analogue

To avoid introducing project-specific factors and to ensure ready comparability with other fiscal structures, Wood Mackenzie uses a standard field (production & cost profile) as the basis of our calculations of project economics. To ensure relevance to Australia, we have selected a proxy for a large-scale offshore gas development as our assumed profile. The asset characteristics include:

- **Reserve size:** 4 tcf
- **Peak gas production:** 450 mmcf/d
- **E&A and development spend:** A\$1,035M (US\$750M) and A\$8,832M (US\$6,400M), respectively, in 2026 real terms
- **Unit OPEX:** A\$0.77/mcf (US\$0.56/mcf) in 2026 real terms
- **Operational lifespan:** 27 years

To capture the economics of an integrated asset (upstream + LNG), we apply netback pricing (LNG DES price *minus* tolling fee *minus* shipping) to calculate the expected net revenue. Details of price & formula assumed are outlined in the following section. For simplicity, no boil-off gas is assumed.

Macroeconomics

Our model's assumed netback pricing consists of the following:

$$\text{Netback pricing} = \text{LNG (DES) price} - \text{tolling fee} - \text{shipping fee}$$

- **LNG (DES) price:** 12.5% x Brent + 0.5 (assumes all volumes are contracted; no spot sales)
 - Brent prices assumed in our models are US\$70/bbl ("base line" price scenario) and US\$120 /bbl ("windfall" price scenario), both in 2026 real terms
- **Tolling fee:** A\$3.45/mcf (US\$2.5/mcf) (2026 real terms)
- **Shipping fee:** A\$1.10/mcf (US\$0.8/mcf) (2026 real terms) (assumed to be the same across peer regimes for simplicity)
- **Exchange rate:** Wood Mackenzie Q1 2026 Exchange Rate Forecast long-term real exchange rate: US\$1 = A\$1.38.

This translates to the following realised netback prices:

- **"Base line" price scenario:** A\$8.21/mmBtu (US\$5.95/mmBtu) (2026 real terms)
- **"Windfall" price scenario:** A\$16.84/mmBtu (US\$12.20/mmBtu) (2026 real terms)

For both prices and costs, we apply an annual 2% escalation; for NPV/delayed cashflow calculation purposes, we apply a 10% discount rate.

Comparable regimes & fiscal terms

For the purposes of evaluating Australia's fiscal competitiveness against comparable regimes, we have included the following regimes into the peer group: **United States, Canada, Norway, Qatar, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia**. Our assessments are performed based on our proprietary database of concession/PSC documents. The following outlines the key assumptions we've adopted for each fiscal regime:

Table – Peer regimes' assumed fiscal terms

Regime	Contract type	Royalty	Cost Recovery Ceiling	Gov't Profit / Revenue Share	Federal CIT / PIT	State Equity	Other
Australia (Federal)	Concession	-	-	-	30.0%	-	PRRT (40%)
United States (GoM)⁽¹⁾	Concession	18.75%	-	-	21.0%	-	-
Canada (BC)⁽²⁾	Concession	5-36% (price dependent)	-	-	15.0%	-	Provincial income tax (12%)
Norway	Concession	-	-	-	22.0%	0-30% ⁽³⁾	Special tax (71.8%)
Qatar	Concession ⁽⁴⁾	15.0%	-	-	35.0%	40.0%	-
Papua New Guinea	Concession	2.0%	-	-	30.0%	22.5%	Development levy (2%), APT (30%)
Timor-Leste	PSC	5.0%	100.0%	40.0%	30.0%	20.0%	Supp. petroleum tax (22.5%)
Nigeria⁽⁵⁾	Concession	5.0%	-	-	30.0%	-	Education tax (3%)
Malaysia⁽⁶⁾	PSC	10.0%	60-80%	20-50%	38.0%	15.0%	Supp. payment (50-70%)
Indonesia⁽⁷⁾	PSC	10.0% (FTP)	100.0%	19.9%	37.6%	10.0%	Land & building tax (0.5%)
United Kingdom⁽⁸⁾	Concession	-	-	-	30.0% (RFCT)	-	Supp. charge (10%), EPL (38%)

(1) Assumes water depth of >200m (shallow water w/ water depth of <200m are subject to a lower 12.5% royalty under the US GoM fiscal terms)

(2) While there are no offshore upstream opportunities in British Columbia, the province's fiscal terms are most relevant among Canada's provinces given the concentration of (potential) LNG developments in the region

(3) Variable range; direct state participation (state equity) is typically between 0% and 20% to 30% via Petoro (State's Direct Financial Interest). Indirect participation via majority ownership of Equinor does not contribute to State Equity figures but does increase the Norwegian Government's participation indirectly. Petoro pays share of exploration and development costs (no carried costs).

(4) Historically, production in Qatar was taxed under Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), but since 2014 the renewal of licenses has been under a Concession (tax and royalty) framework. The exact Concession terms have not been made publicly available. As a result, our assumptions are based on operator feedback of existing contracts. We expect Concessions to be used for future license awards

(5) "Hydrocarbon Tax" payable only on onshore & shallow water oil production

(6) Cost recovery PSC for deepwater assets; fiscal structures like EPT, SFA, and LLA are not considered in this study

(7) Cost recovery PSC for deepwater assets; Gross Split terms are not considered in this study

(8) Provided for reference (EPL case study); not considered a "peer" in WM's fiscal competitiveness analysis for Australia's offshore/LNG assets

Calculation approach

When conducting the analysis, we adopt the following in our calculations:

- **Process:** Based on the selected analogue, we calculate the "pre-tax"/operational cash flow net to all shareholders (i.e., before government take). We subsequently apply each regime's fiscal terms to assess the impact of each jurisdiction's fiscal structures on investor IRR, NPV, and state share.
- **Cash flow calculation method:** This approach assumes that the hypothetical investor had recently acquired a licence and is conducting operations under the latest terms available for exploration in each jurisdiction. The economics of each development are calculated on a full cycle (incl. exploration cost) & standalone basis, and only direct taxes and fiscal terms associated with production / revenue / profit of the project are evaluated (i.e., excludes VAT, withholding taxes, among others).
- **Evaluation metrics:** To ensure a more holistic evaluation and comparison of the impact of the windfall levy, we calculate three metrics that are widely accepted and used within the oil & gas industry:
 - **Internal Rate of Return (IRR):** Discount rate at which NPV of cashflows equals zero.
 - **Net Present Value (NPV):** The sum of project costs (cash outflows) and cashflow generated from a project (cash inflows), discounted at 10%.
 - **Government share %:** Government take as a share of operational/"pre-tax" field profits. This includes royalties, corporate income taxes, government profit share and any other fees or levies. **State share** also includes state equity % where applicable (required in certain regimes).

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